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ABSTRACT
This article addresses the unresolved conundrum of the legal status of
consent forms used in research involving tissue samples or personal
data. It identifies which rights participants might have by virtue of
any consent form they have signed and which legal remedies might be
available to them should the research depart from the terms of the ori-
ginal consent. The paper demonstrates that, although the legal status of
consent forms is not clear in the UK, the landscape is evolving. We
suggest that the growing legal protection afforded to autonomy and
judicial recognition of individual property rights in tissues may offer op-
portunities for remedies in law where the regulatory regimes controlling
uses of human tissue and personal data do not. However, we argue that
in the governance of research relationships—which depend crucially on
trust—resort to legal remedy may be undesirable. We suggest that treat-
ing consent as a one-off event that can be effectively captured in a
written document—as the law tends to do—is an inappropriate and
counter-productive approach. The aims of ethical research governance
will be better served by seeing consent as continuing relational
process, requiring on-going mutual respect, opportunity for communi-
cation, and accommodation of changing circumstances. The consent
form is merely a framing instrument and only the starting point for a
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partnership that will evolve over time. Crucially, the limits of consent
must be recognised in the design and governance of modern research
practices. The article concludes with recommendations to reconceive
consent in these terms.
I. THE ROLE OF CONSENT FORMS IN HEALTH-RELATED
RESEARCH
A. The Ethical Basis for (Informed) Consent
It is trite to observe that in recent decades, respect for the right to self-
determination, or autonomy, has become the dominant ethical principle
in bioethics.1 This shift has led to a corollary emphasis on informed
consent in both treatment and research settings. Seeking and obtaining
informed consent for a medical or research intervention, the collection
of tissue samples, or the use of samples and personal data in research
has become the principal and ostensibly legitimate means by which
patients and research participants are expected to understand risks and
consequences of procedures and to determine whether they are prepared
to submit to these.2However, the presumption that consent is the only, or
best, way to protect autonomy has been challenged.3 In the context of
health research, questions have also been raised about whether the im-
portance of obtaining participant consent is emphasised at the expense
of the pursuit of a legitimate public interest in generating research find-
ings.4 Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that consent, and the
signed forms that document this, now occupy talismanic status in a re-
search culture that places central importance on protecting participants’
autonomy and being seen to do so. Beyond this, consent is also frequently
assumed to cement trust within the research relationship. Trust is self-
evidently vital to the reputation of the researcher or institution involved,
as well as to the future viability of all research involving human partici-
pants. Accordingly, consent today is asked to do a lot of work: to serve
to protect individual interests, to promote personal autonomy, to act as
1 TL Beauchamp and JF Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (6th edn
OUP 2009) at 417; see also O O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics
Gifford Lectures, University of Edinburgh (CUP 2002). O’Neill argues
against the equiparation of respect for autonomy with obtaining informed
consent.
2 JK Mason and GT Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics (8th edn Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2011) at 639.
3 GT Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (Cambridge
University Press, New York 2002) 335; NC Manson and O O’Neill, Rethink-
ing Informed Consent in Bioethics (Cambridge University Press 2007) 212;
O’Neill, above, n 1.
4 The Academy of Medical Sciences ‘Personal Data for Public Good: Using
Health Information in Medical Research’ (2006).
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a foundation for trust, and to stand as a cornerstone for the research
enterprise. This article questions whether this is a sustainable position
in the current research climate, particularly when this is increasing typi-
fied by ‘legalisation’ of the consent process and fetishisation of the
consent form itself. It is argued that an ironic unlooked-for consequence
of this legal phenomenon might end up being less emphasis on trust and
the elements of a good researcher/participant relationship. This leaves the
core ethical objectives of consent open to serious question and suggests a
need to reconceive the role of the consent form.
In order to begin the analysis, it is important to be clear about both
the form and the function of consent. The failure to consider this prop-
erly has led to considerable conceptual and practical confusion in both
clinical and research settings and in the related literatures.5 As to func-
tion, O’Neill characterises consent as a ‘propositional attitude’, that is, a
response to a proposition describing action yet to be undertaken. For
O’Neill, the function of consent is to limit deception or coercion.6
Our own view is the subject of this entire paper. As to form, there are
nowmany different qualifying adjectives that describe consent to research
participation. These include: informed,7 broad,8 open,9 blanket,10
generic,11 specific,12 explicit,13 appropriate,14 valid, and written
consent. Some of these categories are widely used and recognised. For
5 For example, there is a sizeable literature on the limitations of the translating
an informed consent model into the context of biobanking, see inter alia, J-A
Skolbekken and others, ‘Not worth the paper it’s written on? Informed
consent and biobank research in a norwegian context’ (2005) 15 (4) Critical
Public Health 335 and S Kristinsson and V Arnason, ‘Informed consent and
human genetic database research’, in M Hayry et al. (eds), The Ethics and
Governance of Human Genetic Databases, Law, Medicine and Ethics (CUP
2007) 199. In the context of research uses of genetic data, Taylor has sug-
gested a need for greater clarity on the necessity and proportionality of
consent requirements for under the European Data Protection Directive,
Mark Taylor, Genetic Data and the Law: A Critical Perspective on Privacy
Protection , Cambridge Bioethics and Law (CUP 2012) at 217.
6 O O’Neill, ‘Some limits of informed consent’ (2003) 29 (1) Journal of Medical
Ethics 4, 5.
7 A MacLean, ‘From Sidaway to Pearce and beyond: is the legal regulation of
consent any better following a quarter of a century of judicial scrutiny?’
(2012) 20 (1) Med L Rev 108.
8 T Caulfield and J Kaye, ‘Broad consent in biobanking: reflections on seemingly
insurmountable dilemmas’ (2009) 10 (2) Med L Int 85–100.
9 JE Lunshof and others, ‘From genetic privacy to open consent’ (2008) 9 Nat
Rev Genet 406.
10 T Caulfield, ‘Biobanks and blanket consent: the proper place of the public
good and public perception rationales’ (2007) 18 (2) King’s Law Journal 209.
11 Ibid.
12 MOtlowski, ‘Tackling legal challenges posed by population biobanks: recon-
ceptualising consent requirements’ (2012) 20 (2) Med L Rev 191.
13 Ibid.
14 P Taylor, ‘When consent gets in the way’ (2008) 456 Nature 32.
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example, valid consent is usually used to mean that which meets the
three criteria of sufficient informedness, capacity, and voluntariness.15
Informedconsent is usually taken tomean consent basedon the disclosure
of ‘any factswhich are necessary to form thebasis of an intelligent consent
by the patient to the proposed treatment’, and this is true also in re-
search.16 The principal aim of disclosure is to support patient or partici-
pant autonomy. This, however, is far from a straightforward objective
chiefly because of the challenge of deciding what information it is neces-
sary or possible to give and whether full comprehension is ever achiev-
able.17 This is compounded in the research context because research
itself is an inherently uncertain exercise. Future risks and benefits are
largely unknown and the nature of the enterprise can takemany unantici-
pated turns towards an elusive goal. This limits considerably what
consent procedures can achieve in terms of informedness and suggests
that the role played by trust is all the more important.
It is also important to appreciate that consent is asked to do different
work for different groups. For example, research participants differ
from patients in a number of ways. Research participants are not
15 General Medical Council, ‘Good Practice in Research and Consent to Re-
search’ (2010) 8; the NHS National Research Ethics Service guidance on
informed consent in clinical trials draws upon the International Conference
on Harmonisation: Good Clinical Practice’s (ICH GCP) definition of
informed consent according to which ‘a subject voluntarily confirms his or
her willingness to participate in a particular trial, after having been informed
of all aspects of the trial that are relevant to the subject’s decision to partici-
pate’ and should also be documented in a signed form (National Research
Ethics Service, ‘Information Sheet and Consent Forms: Guidance for
Researchers and Reviewers’ (March 2011) at 89). The UK Department of
Health in guidance regarding treatment contexts refers not to informed,
but valid consent, which it defines as that which is ‘given voluntarily by an
appropriately informed person who has the capacity to consent to the inter-
vention in question’, Department of Health ‘Reference Guide to Consent for
Examination or Treatment’ (2nd edn 2009) at 9.
16 Salgo v Leland Stanford Junior University Board of Trustees 317 P 2d 170
(Cal, 1957), though this is a US case, and as such does not establish precedent
in the UK.
17 In Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the
Maudsley Hospital [1984] QB 493, [1984] 1 All ER 1018 it was observed
that ‘The doctrine of informed consent forms no part of English law’, per
Dunn LJ at 517. Yet, the expression ‘informed consent’ has featured in
many UK medical law cases since its first use Chatterton v Gerson [1981]
QB 432, [1981] 1 All ER 257, including the influential House of Lords judg-
ment in Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134. Even though
the doctrine of informed consent as such has not been applied by the UK
Courts, and the legal question of what information must be supplied is still
developing, this doctrine may nonetheless be seen as having set the tone for
approaches to the role of consent and the consent form in the UK which
focuses on the assumption that material information to a decision can be sup-
plied in a one-off event and cover all relevant contingencies potentially affect-
ing the consenter, see Mason and Laurie , above, n 2 at 108–11.
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normally subject to interventions in the interests of their own health;18
instead, they can be seen as voluntary collaborators in a joint endeavour
pursued in the public interest.19 It does not follow, of course, that the
need to protect their interests and to engage them in a relationship
founded on trust is any less pressing. Rather, the consent form as used
in research is typically expected to fulfil a more complex role than
that of its clinical counterpart. In the latter, its chief purpose is to
record a patient’s agreement to a particular procedure, thus protecting
their interests in bodily integrity and autonomy and to ensure the pro-
cedure does not constitute battery. This is also true in research where
there is physical contact, for example in a clinical trial, but much re-
search also involves human tissues and data. In such circumstances,
the principle of informed consent is also expected to cover privacy inter-
ests in respect of participants’ personal data and, potentially, property
interests in tissues as well. The research consent form is likely to docu-
ment that valid consent has been obtained for the collection, conditions
of storage, and most pertinently to our current inquiry, any proposed or
prohibited use(s) of the tissue/data now and in the future.20 The
dilemma which arises is whether it is possible or reasonable to expect
the consent form toperformall of these taskswhen the future is uncertain,
when circumstances and expectations might change over time and when
trust is likely to depend more on what happens after the consent form is
signed than on what is said beforehand.
This might be less worrying but for the increasing encroachment of
law on the form and function of the consent procedure. In particular,
it has been argued by Hall that ‘. . . optimal levels of trust and distrust
emerge through private ordering, without the assistance of law’.21
The concern is that the legalisation of consent, by which we mean the
reduction to rule-specific prescription with respect to the consent form
itself, cannot only miss much about the nature and needs of the research
relationship, but can actually perform a disservice to trust in that it per-
petuates a view that those seeking consent are not to be trusted. Indeed,
18 Sheila Mclean, A Patient’s Right to Know: Information Disclosure, the
Doctor and the Law, Medico-Legal Series (Ashgate Dartmouth 1989) at 183.
19 Nuffield Council on Bioethics ‘Human Bodies: Donation for Medicine and
Research’ (2011) at 151.
20 The following discussion is based on a presumption that research participants
are adult and competent at the time their consent was obtained and remain
so. Specific legal issues are also raised by the ethical and practical challenges
of obtaining valid consent for research from children or adults who lack cap-
acity. These are important, but will not be considered further here. See
further, JK Mason, and GT Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics, n 2 above,
Chs 19 and 20.
21 MA Hall, ‘Law, medicine and trust’ (2002) 55 (2) Stanford Law Review 463
at 484.
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counterproductively this can actually result in less trustworthy behav-
iour because the incentive to so act on professional grounds is
removed and replaced by threat of legal sanction.22 While this article
cannot hope to establish whether this is true as a matter of fact, it
does seek to demonstrate a growing legal focus on the consent form—
a tendency towards its fetishisation—and to suggest that this is an impo-
verished means of giving effect to the ethical objectives of consent and,
indeed, of a responsible research relationship.
B. The Importance of Establishing the Legal Status of Consent
Forms
Despite the ubiquity of the subject of consent in the academic and pro-
fessional literature, we do not know the precise legal status of consent
forms used in research in the UK. Much of the regulatory landscape
has been heavily influenced by the requirements laid down in instru-
ments such as the Clinical Trials Directive.23 While important, these
should not lead to a conclusion that a one-size-fits all approach
applies across all forms of research. For example, the Clinical Trials Dir-
ective mandates written consent, but in other cases, as when tissues are
collected from participants or where DNA analysis is to be conducted
using identifiable samples, different forms of consent can be accommo-
dated by law.24 Thus, as will be demonstrated, obtaining the written
informed consent of participants is not normally a legal requirement
for research per se. Nevertheless, it is now standard practice to do so
and often heralded as best practice.25 This, however, is still to focus
chiefly on the form of consent rather than its essential function.26 The
following sections demonstrate that a failure to be clear on the function
of consent can lead to a tendency to overburden the consent process and
to expect too much of the consent form.
For practical and legal purposes, it is important to recognise that,
although it may be a convenient short-hand to refer to ‘the consent
22 NC Manson and O O’Neill, above, n 3 at 161.
23 Directive 2001/20/EC of 4 April 2001, of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States relating to implementation of good clinical
practice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products for human use.
It is telling, for example, that the UKGovernment used the advent of the Clin-
ical Trials Directive to undertake an overhaul of the governance of medical
research generally in the UK.
24 See, for example s 45 of the Human Tissue Act 2004 and Schedule 4 with
respect to DNA analysis.
25 P Boddington and others, ‘Consent forms in genomics: the difference between
law and practice’ (2011) 18 (5) European Journal of Health Law 491, 517.
26 On the legal function of consent in a range of fields, see D Beyleveld and R
Brownsword, Consent in the Law, Legal Theory Today (Hart Publishing,
2007) Ch 3.
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form’, in reality this is likely to refer to multiple consent-related docu-
ments, encompassing not only the signed form but also the accompany-
ing information sheet.27 Additional documentation, such as
correspondence, might provide further material from which the partici-
pant may draw inferences about the nature of that to which they are con-
senting.28 The National Research Ethics Service (NRES) advises that
‘[t]he participant is consenting to everything described in the text of
the information sheet’.29 However, it has been observed that the infor-
mation sheet may be called upon to play a dual role, as both a ‘prospec-
tus’ inviting participation and a legal document setting out matters such
as insurance responsibilities, which complicates its function as a
decision-making tool.30 Indeed, the idea that the consent form can sim-
ultaneously protect the patient from harm and protect the researcher
from liability is a clear example of how the consent form as quasi-legal
instrument can set up an oppositional dynamic which is more reflective
of a situation where trust is absent than one in which trust is a central
concern.
There are no mandatory standard formats for research consent forms,
although NRES does provide detailed guidance on optimal structure
and content for health-related studies.31 A recent review of genomic
studies found that the content of consent forms in this field is a ‘mix
of legal requirements, ethical principles, and accrued practice’ and is
likely to vary between research contexts.32 That review cited evidence
that the choice of what is included in a consent form might not
always reflect the highest priorities in terms of what the participant is
legally bound to be told or which information is most likely to protect
27 It is possible that the participant is unable to sign or mark a consent form her/
himself, in which case if may be acceptable for them to give their consent
orally in the presence of a witness and have this recorded in writing (for
example, Part 1, paragraph 3(i) to Schedule 1 to The Medicines For
Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regs 2004)—for the purposes of this paper
these will be taken as equivalent.
28 NRES advises that RECs attend not only to the context of consent forms and
information sheets, but also to other accompanying documents, such as ques-
tionnaires, letters of invitation, letters to GPs or other clinicians, or informa-
tion sheets for relatives or carers, NHS National Research Ethics Service
‘Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the
United Kingdom’ v5.1 (March 2012) at 111.
29 NRES ‘Information Sheets and Consent Forms Guidance’, above, n 15 at 27.
30 N Armstrong and others, ‘Do informed consent documents for cancer trials
do what they should? A Study of Manifest and Latent Functions’ Sociology of
Health and Illness (in press and available online from 22 March 2012,
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9566.2012.01469.x).
31 NRES Information Sheets and Consent Forms Guidance, above, n 15 at 27.
32 Boddington and others, above, n 25 at 492. The reference to ‘legal require-
ments’ here refers to the requirement to obtain informed consent, not to
document it in a form.
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or enhance their interests, which suggests a net failure to reflect appro-
priately on what the consent form is trying to achieve.33 For example, a
form might include a description of the study’s aims, but neglect to
document what advice the patient has been given about potential
future uses of samples or data. Indeed, as we have indicated, it might
not be possible to provide information about future uses at the time
that consent is obtained as these are not known and cannot yet be antici-
pated. This is typically the case in biobank research and has necessitated
radical rethinking of the nature and role of consent and a shift away
from the conventional paradigm of informed consent, that is, one that
assumes that material facts are known and can be effectively communi-
cated at the time consent is obtained—to broad consent.34 A broad
consent approach recognises the impossibility of providing all material
information up-front and focuses, rather, on the notion of consent as
a threshold device to the beginnings of a research relationship.35
Broad consent models tend to be accompanied by oversight mechanisms
that monitor the research relationship over time.36 Research governance
faces the challenges of being in a transition phase, one implication of
which is that the role of the consent form requires reconsideration.
There are, however, two particular hurdles to the kinds of reconsider-
ation that are required. First, the dominant paradigm remains the
informed consent model and this has implications for the expectations
of researchers, participants, research ethics committees, and, ultimately,
the courts. Secondly, the tendency to focus attention on the consent
form as the source of evidence about these expectations raises questions
33 Ibid at 517–8. This study found that while information about project aims
was the most common feature of the genomic research consent forms they
surveyed, information about storage and future uses was only ‘sometimes’
included.
34 Most recently, LifeGene biobank in Sweden has run into serious difficulties
after the Swedish Data Inspection Board ruled that it could no longer
collect prospective data from its 500,000 participants nor, indeed, process
those already collected. The reasoning was that participants could not give
valid consent to a proposition about future health research because it was in-
sufficiently explicit. See further here: ,http://ethicsblog.crb.uu.se/2011/12/
20/the-swedish-data-inspection-board-stops-large-biobank/. accessed 11
August 2012.
35 For example, M Otlowski, ‘Developing an Appropriate Consent Model for
Biobanks: In Defence of “Broad” Consent’, in J Kaye and M Stranger
(eds), Principles and Practice in Biobank Governance (Ashgate 2009) 79.
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics report in donation of bodily materials
endorses the position ‘that it is appropriate routinely to seek generic
consent [of which broad consent is one kind] (where necessary in addition
to specific consent) for the research use of blood and tissue’, above, n 19 at
204.
36 For suggestions about ways to approach this, see GT Laurie ‘Reflexive gov-
ernance in biobanking: on the value of policy led approaches and the need
to recognise the limits of law’ (2011) 130 Human Genetics 347.
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about entitlement and reliance on its terms. In particular, it leads us to
ask when, if at all, might a consent form function as a kind of legal in-
strument, for example as a contract or quasi-contract, and what conse-
quences might follow from this?
Seeing consent forms as legal or quasi-legal documents predisposes us
towards certain ways of thinking about them. For example, a legalistic
approach to consent forms will necessarily focus on the precise terms
in which these documents are framed. Prima facie, these forms are sug-
gestive of assent by a person to a particular proposition put to them, viz,
to participate in research; but as we have seen, the proposition is highly
uncertain. Thus, to consider the function of the consent form in these
circumstances, it is one of framing an instrument that has to deal with
considerable uncertainties and a prospective enterprise that might
change over time. The wording of a form will become crucial in any
future attempts to understand retrospectively what someone has con-
sented to, and there are significant challenges of interpretation. For
example, should words be interpreted literally or in a common sense
fashion? Should we be concerned to understand what the ‘reasonable re-
search participant’ would understand by the words, or the particular
participant? And, do participants only consent to that which is explicitly
mentioned, thereby necessarily excluding that which is not? Moreover,
can we proceed on the assumption that the wording of a consent form
actually reflects participants’ genuine expectations? Many studies
provide evidence of mismatch between the wording of consent forms
(or the accompanying information documents) and participants’ under-
standings and expectations.37
Questions about the legal status of consent forms grow ever more
pressing as secondary research uses of existing collections of samples,
data, or products derived from these become increasingly common.
These uses may or may not be covered by the terms of the original
consent. Where new studies are planned using existing collections, the
terms of participants’ consent forms might provide the basis for deciding
whether their existing consent covers the new research purpose.38 It is
worthwhile noting that such exclusions might not only take an explicit
formulation as in ‘your tissues/data will not be used for purpose x’, but
could also be implied by positive formulations such as ‘your tissues/data
37 Armstrong and others, above, n 30; M Dixon-Woods and others, ‘Beyond
“misunderstanding”: written information and decisions about taking part
in a genetic epidemiology study’ (2007) 65 (11) Social Science & Medicine
2212; Y Freer and others, ‘More Information, Less Understanding: A Rando-
mized Study on Consent Issues in Neonatal Research’ (2009) 123 (5) Pediat-
rics 1301; E Fried, ‘The therapeutic misconception, beneficence, and respect’
(2001) 8(4) Accountability in Research: Policies & Quality Assurance 331.
38 Boddington and others, above, n 25 at 492.
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will be used for purpose y’ which might be interpreted by access com-
mittees as excluding uses other than y.39 Currently, while the wording
of a consent form in the above terms might well offer a pragmatic or
ethical basis for determining which research purposes are prohibited,
it is less clear whether it provides anything with more legal teeth
than this.
The recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in
Gillberg v Sweden illustrates just how precarious the legal status of
apparent commitments made by researchers to research participants
may be when tested in the courtroom.40 In the instant case the applicant,
a university professor, had refused to share with external researchers
data from participants in a study for which he was responsible,
despite a court order requiring him to do so. His grounds for refusing
were that he had twice made written commitments to participants
(and their parents) that their data would remain confidential, and that
breaking these would run contrary to ethical research practices, discredit
research, and deter future participation.41 The Grand Chamber declined
to recognise the applicant’s claim that his criminal conviction for refus-
ing to disclose the data constituted a breach of his ‘negative right’ under
Article 10—the right to refuse to impart particular information.42
In finding that no such a right was engaged in the instant case, the
Grand Chamber held that it was not possible for a public authority
such as a university to enter into an agreement with another party
that that unconditionally exempted publically owned documents from
public access.43 Furthermore, it found that no legal or other obligations
prevented the researcher from disclosing the data, his only impediment
was his belief that it would be wrong to do so.44 Despite not concerning
consent forms per se—and we have already noted the ambiguity in what
is included under this label—this case confirms just how little legal force
written commitments regarding the handling of participants’ personal
data can have. The judgment indicates that this might be particularly
39 For an example of such an interpretation of an instance inwhich a consent form
specified samples would be used for ‘medical research studies’ see P Burton,
‘Policy for use and oversight of samples and data arising from the 1958 birth
cohort (National ChildDevelopment Study)’ (Unpublished, Access Committee
for CLS Cohorts, 2009) 14, available here ,http://www2.le.ac.uk/projects/
birthcohort/document-downloads/POLICY.DOCUMENT.120609.pdf..
40 Gillberg v Sweden, Application no 41723/06, 3 April 2012.
41 Ibid at [37].
42 Ibid at [97].
43 Ibid at [87] The participants’ data were held to be the property of the Univer-
sity by whom the applicant was employed and as such were held to be public
documents subject to subject to the principle of public access under the
Swedish Freedom of the Press Act and the Secrecy Act.
44 Ibid at [91].
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true where the commitments made by researchers seek to impose stricter
or more absolute obligations (in the instant case, of confidentiality) than
those required or permitted in law.
C. Locating the Legal Status of the Consent Form: Three
Suggestions
The Gillberg judgment notwithstanding, where researchers make com-
mitments to participants as part of the consent process and research is
then conducted in a way that is at odds with these commitments—for
instance by the pursuit of apparently precluded activities using
donated tissues or personal data—one might be concerned that this de-
parture fails to respect the interests of the research participants in deter-
mining how their data or tissues are used. Assuming the broken
commitments are not in themselves in tension with domestic laws gov-
erning the handling of data or tissues, we might then ask whether par-
ticipants’ interests enjoy any protection in law by virtue of being
recorded in written consent documents. In order to address this ques-
tion, the following three sections consider the legal force of the terms
in which consent forms are couched and what redress might be available
to participants if these terms are violated. This does not commit us to
any view of whether such a legalistic approach is warranted, or
indeed desirable. That question is considered in Section V below.
As already indicated, the precise legal standing of the consent form in
health-related research has not been tested in the UK courts. We know in
the treatment context that failure to obtain valid consent renders touch-
ing an unwarranted act and is likely to constitute battery or assault.45
We also know that the courts in the UK have shown decreasing defer-
ence to the medical profession in recent years in terms of what patients
must be told as a matter of law, moving from a professionally deter-
mined standard (what would a responsible body of health care practi-
tioners consider appropriate to disclose?)46 to a form of prudent
patient standard (what would a reasonable patient need to know in
terms of significant risks?).47 We also know that the courts are willing
to bend the rules of causation where it is thought that sub-optimal infor-
mation procedures have undermined patient autonomy.48 We cannot
assume, however, that these legal positions regarding treatment are
reflected in the research context.49 Accordingly, the following
45 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432 and Appleton v Garrett (1995) 34
BMLR 23.
46 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital, above, n 17.
47 Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1999) 48 BMLR 118.
48 Chester v Afshar, above, n 17.
49 It is also important to note that these treatment consent parameters have been
developed exclusively in the context of the negligence action; this article
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commentary is speculative and adopts a first-principle approach of con-
sidering a range of possible legal conceptualisations or qualities that
could be attributed to the research consent form. For each of these,
the likely legal significance of the consent form and the opportunities
for redress for participants will be explored. We argue by analogy and
with reference to existing precedents in order to understand how exist-
ing lawmight apply when research departs from the terms of the consent
as documented.
We consider each of the following possible conceptualisations in turn:
(i) the consent form as a regulatory requirement;
(ii) the consent form as a pseudo-contractual basis for the allocation of
property rights; and
(iii) the consent form as the basis for actions protecting personal
autonomy.
II. THE CONSENT FORM AS A REGULATORY
REQUIREMENT
A. When Is Consent Required?
Conducting research that involves physical contact (including obtaining
tissue samples) without research participant consent would undoubted-
ly amount to battery under the common law in precisely the same way as
it does in the treatment context. This arises from the principle of the in-
violability of a person’s body as an aspect of their right to self-
determination.50 Where tissue is removed in a research context, rather
than for therapeutic purposes, the consent must be informed, explicit,
and for reasons in the public interest, but need not be given in writing
to be valid.51 The subsequent storage and use of human tissues compris-
ing cells from living donors (excluding gametes, embryos, and genetic
material) for research purposes are then regulated under the Human
Tissue Act 2004 (HTA 2004).52
addresses research conducted under a far wider set of legal regimes, both
statutory and common law.
50 A Grubb and others, Principles of Medical Law (3rd edn OUP 2010) 1205 at
[8.01]. Cases confirming this in both the treatment and research contexts are:
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, [1993] 1 All ER 821 and
Malette v Shulman (Canadian), Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation), and Re
T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432,
[1981] 1 All ER 257 and Simms v Simms, A v A [2002] 2 WLR 1465,
[2003] 1 All ER 669. On the continuum from treatment, experimentation,
and research see Walker-Smith v GMC [2012] EWHC 503 (Admin) at [12].
51 Grubb and others, ibid at [8.38].
52 This Act for the most part only applies in England and Wales. There is no
equivalent legislation in Scotland, where the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act
12 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2012]
 at Edinburgh U
niversity on June 12, 2013
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Consent is the fundamental principle according to which use and
storage of human tissues may be rendered lawful under the HTA
2004, but it is not legally mandated under all circumstances.53 Purposes
requiring ‘appropriate consent’ under the Act—which means, when the
person concerned is alive, the tautologous act of ‘obtaining his
consent’54—include the storage and use of tissues for ‘research in con-
nection with disorders, or the functioning, of the human body’.55
However, tissues taken from living persons may be used for research
without consent if the researcher would not be able to identify the
donor and the research has ethical approval.56 Social research is not
among the ‘scheduled purposes’ of the Act requiring consent, nor do
the consent conditions apply to ‘existing holdings’ of tissues collected
before this legislation came into force.57 The Human Tissue Authority
(HTA) Code of Practice on consent advises that: ‘it is good practice to
request generic consent because this avoids the need to obtain further
consent in the future’.58 The Code of Practice contrasts ‘generic
consent’ with ‘specific consent’ and advises that the former is more
appropriate in research contexts. The HTA does not itself provide a def-
inition of generic consent beyond that implied by the passage quoted
above. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has offered a definition
where ‘[g]eneric consent may be understood as “blanket” consent,
where no limits at all are placed on the future use of the material’.59
Section 45 of the HTA 2004 makes non-consensual DNA analysis a
criminal offence.60 There are exceptions to this prohibition. Non-
consensual DNA analysis of identifiable tissues is lawful if these were
part of existing collections when the HTA 2004 came into force and
the purpose of analysis is one of a specified list, which includes
medical research. Non-consensual DNA analysis for research concern-
ing ‘disorders, or the functioning, of the human body’ is lawful under
a specific exemption using collections made subsequently to the intro-
duction of the Act on three conditions: the tissue donor is alive, the
research has ethical approval, and the researcher cannot identify the
2006 covers only tissues obtained for transplant purposes or from deceased
persons.
53 JA Bovenberg, ‘Inalienably yours? The new case for an inalienable property
right in human biological material: empowerment of sample donors or a
recipe for a tragic anti-commons?’ (2004) 1 (4) SCRIPT-ed 553.
54 Section 3(2) of the Human Tissue Act 2004.
55 Part 1, Paragraph 6, of Schedule 1 to the Human Tissue Act (HTA) 2004.
56 ‘HTA Code of Practice 1: Consent’ (Human Tissue Authority ) at [117].
57 HTA 2004, s 9. The relevant date is 1 September 2006.
58 ‘HTA Code of Practice 1’, above, n 56 at [36].
59 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2011), above, n 19 at 204 [box 7.3].
60 This section of the HTA 2004 also applies in Scotland.
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donor.61 However, the HTA Code of Practice recommends once again
that, where practicable, consent should nevertheless be obtained.62
When research involves data from which individuals can be identified,
it must comply with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998
(DPA 1998). The DPA 1998 regulates ‘personal data’ and, for the pur-
poses of the Act, this excludes anonymised data.63 The effect of the ap-
plication of the DPA is that certain requirements and principles must be
observed with respect to the ‘processing’ of the personal data, including
its obtention, retention, and use.64 Personal data can only be processed
on a limited number of specified legal grounds, including consent.
However, consent is only one of the sufficient conditions for lawful pro-
cessing of personal data under the DPA 1998. If consent is sought and
the processing involves ‘sensitive data’, a category to which health infor-
mation belongs, then the consent must be ‘explicit’, which suggests a
role for the written form. This additional condition is not required if
the data are to be used for ‘medical purposes’.65 These include
‘medical research’ if the research is conducted by someone bound by
the same kind of duty of confidentiality as a health professional.66 Fur-
thermore, the research exemption in the DPA 1998 permits personal
data to be used for research purposes other than those for which they
were originally collected; there is no obligation under the Act to
re-contact participants to inform them of new research purposes and
access to the data need not be given to the data subject even if
requested.67 Moreover, such data can be kept indefinitely. However,
the research exemption only applies in limited circumstances provided
61 Part 2, paragraph 10 to Schedule 4 of the HTA 2004.
62 ‘HTA Code of Practice 9: Research’ (Human Tissue Authority ) at [52]. It is
relevant to note here that although exemptions from s 45 also apply to non-
consensual DNA analysis for the purposes of clinical audit, education or
training relating to human health and public health monitoring, there is no
exemption for research conducted for non-health-related purposes.
63 DPA 1998 s 1(1). Under the Act ‘personal data’ means data, which is held by
a public authority or on an automatically searchable filing system, that relates
to a living individual who can be identified (a) from those data, or (b) from
those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely
to come into the possession of, the data controller, and includes any expres-
sion of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions of
the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual.
64 Schedule 1 to the DPA 1998.
65 Both the broad requirement for explicit consent for the processing of sensitive
data and the exception in the case of data processed for medical purposes
under the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC that forms the
basis for the UK DPA 1998 have recently been reinforced by the Anonymous,
‘Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of Consent’ (01197/11/EN WP187:
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party) at 6, 25.
66 Schedule 3 to the DPA 1998.
67 DPA 1998, s 33(2).
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the following conditions are observed: the data must not be processed to
support measures or decisions with respect to particular individuals, nor
should they be processed in such a way that substantial damage or sub-
stantial distress is (or is likely to be) caused to any data subject, and the
results of the research or any resulting statistics must not made available
in a form which identifies data subjects.68
The latest draft of the new Data Protection Regulation, if adopted in
its present form, would continue to treat ‘data concerning health’ as sen-
sitive data requiring special protection69 unless the data were anon-
ymised.70 Moreover, handling of human tissue would now seem
expressly to be caught by data protection71 and consent would, in all
cases, require to be ‘specific’ and ‘explicit’.72 Draft Article 4.8 makes
it clear that:
‘. . . the data subject’s consent’ means any freely given specific,
informed and explicit indication of his or her wishes by which
the data subject, either by a statement or by a clear affirmative
action, signifies agreement to personal data relating to them being
processed;’73
This would mean in turn that both implied and opt-out options would
not be a valid basis for processing data by consent and some form of
positive act by the participant, such as signing a written consent form,
would always be required. Such provisions might drive the written
consent form culture all the more strongly. By the same token, if this
type of consent is likely to be difficult to obtain—for example, in the
biobank context—this does not mean that processing of data cannot
be lawfully conducted. Rather, it means that consent cannot be the
basis for this. To proceed without consent requires conformity with
68 DPA 1998, s 33(1) and (4).
69 Proposal for a new Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection
Regulation) Brussels, 25 January 2012 COM(2012) 11 final accessible at
,http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_
2012_11_en.pdf..
70 Draft Recital 23 and draft Art 83(1).
71 Draft Recital 26.
72 Draft Art 4.8. See further Recitals 25, 38, and 41 on the requirement that
consent be ‘explicit’. The only further elucidation offered is in para 3.4.1
of the Commission Proposal, n 69 above: ‘In the definition of consent, the cri-
terion “explicit” is added to avoid confusing parallelism with “unambigu-
ous” consent and in order to have one single and consistent definition of
consent, ensuring the awareness of the data subject that, and to what, he
or she gives consent.’
73 The change to a gender-inclusive approach arguably introduces an element of
ambiguity regarding the meaning of ‘them’.
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draft Articles 81 and 83 that allow processing of data concerning health
for research purposes so long as a series of requirements are met, includ-
ing processing in the public interest. Discussion of this is beyond the
scope of this article. Suffice to say that the draft Regulation is reflecting
a somewhat traditional view of consent in the form of ‘written informed
consent’ and threatens to create two parallel approval pathways for re-
search which might simply add to the regulatory burden without any ne-
cessary gain in research participant protection. Equally, both the data
protection regime—old and new—and the tissue regulation regime
make considerable use of the ‘consent or anonymise’ paradigm
whereby it is accepted that consent might not always be required so
long as data or samples are sufficiently anonymised with respect to par-
ticipants from whom they were obtained. We return to the significance
of this presently.
B. Regulatory Requirements for Written Consent
There is a crucial distinction between a statutory obligation to obtain
consent and a requirement that this be given in writing—there is no con-
sistent policy or approach to this in legislation. Furthermore, we cannot
assume that simply because consent has been documented in writing
that this document has independent legal force, or that it is in some
sense constitutive of the consent itself, rather than merely a record of
a prior consent procedure.
The first of these distinctions is manifest in both the DPA 1998 and
the HTA 2004. Even where these statutes do require consent for a par-
ticular research use of tissues or data, neither of them currently requires
this to be given in writing. Although the definition of ‘explicit consent’
under the DPA 1998 remains somewhat ambiguous, it is considered ad-
visable rather than obligatory that this be obtained in writing.74 Under
the HTA 2004, the only occasions in which an adult’s ‘appropriate
consent’ must be given in writing is where this records the prior agree-
ment of a deceased person for certain posthumous uses of their
tissues.75 The absence of statutory requirements for written consent
under these two regimes may be contrasted with the provisions of the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, as amended (HFEA
1990). Consent is a central pillar of the law governing assisted reproduc-
tion in the UK.76 Under the HFE Act 1990, consent to the storage and
74 Art 29 Working Party Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of Consent at 25.
75 HTA 2004, s 3, these uses include public display and anatomical examina-
tions conducted on no-excepted materials.
76 As confirmed most emphatically by the Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights in Evans v United Kingdom (2007) 95 BMLR 107.
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use (including research uses) of a human embryo, or storage of gametes,
must be given in writing.77
In terms of statutory consent regimes, the Clinical Trials Regulations
2004 (CTR 2004) contain perhaps the clearest available statement of the
legal status of written consent forms in research. In this context, a
person has given informed consent to take part in a clinical trial only
if their decision to consent is informed and freely given and this is ‘evi-
denced in writing, dated and signed, or otherwise marked, by that
person so as to indicate his consent’ or, where they are unable to sign
a document, their witnessed, oral consent is recorded in writing.78 So
lawful consent in the context of these Regulations must be written
and the form is itself a legal document, not merely a contingent
record of a discrete legal requirement. However, the CTR 2004 are
not legally binding in other research contexts, such as non-
interventional research using existing collections of tissues and data.
This notwithstanding, these Regulations are of relevance in the
context of our present discussion because it is the UK Department of
Health’s position that:
the operating procedures required by the EU [Clinical Trials] Dir-
ective and the Clinical Trials Regulations should also apply in
general to the review by RECs [Research Ethics Committees] in
the UK of all other health and social care research reviewed
under GAfREC [the Governance Arrangements for Research
Ethics Committees].79
This means that as a matter of policy, if not law, the procedures
required for clinical trials will also apply to the ethical review of all
kinds of research.80 We may infer that the benchmark for ‘appropriate’
77 Paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
1990 (as amended).
78 Paragraph 3 of part 1 to Schedule 1 of theMedicines for Human Use (Clinical
Trials) Regulations 2004.
79 NRES SOPs v5.1, above, n 28 at 14. The Directive referred to here is Direct-
ive 2001/20/EC.
80 Mason and Laurie, above, n 2 at 616; see also Annex 8 to NRES Information
Sheets and Consent Forms Guidance, above, n 15 which also cites the Inter-
national Conference on Harmonisation—Good Clinical Practice as authority
for the necessity for the requirement to obtain written documentation for
informed consent. The UK and Scottish governance frameworks for health
and (respectively) social or community care research, which cover non-
clinical non-invasive research, simply state that ‘[m]ost studies involving indi-
viduals must have appropriate arrangements for obtaining consent, and the
[NHS] ethics review process pays particular attention to those arrange-
ments.’: Department Of Health, ‘Research Governance Framework for
Health and Social Care’ (2nd edn, 2005) at 7; CSO Scottish Executive, ‘Re-
search Governance Framework for Health and Community Care’ (2006) at 5.
Med. L. Rev. Consent form in health research 17
 at Edinburgh U
niversity on June 12, 2013
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
consent arrangements in any health and care research to which GAfREC
applies will be determined with reference to the requirement for written
consent under the CTR 2004.81 This is potentially significant in that the
design and requirements of the clinical trials model of consent then
become the expected ethical norm across the research spectrum.
Prima facie this might look like a positive development if it means a
greater ubiquity of practices that seek to respect autonomy. However,
it might also have the unintended consequence of creating more wide-
spread expectations that consent forms have some force in law and
provide grounds for remedy if research departs from their terms. It
might also perpetuate a particular kind of ‘culture of consent’ when,
as we have seen in the context of tissue and data research, consent
(let alone written consent) is not a legal requirement in all circum-
stances. This threatens to undermine the legitimacy of perfectly lawful
research where consent practices more suitable for clinical trials are
not followed. Moreover, it perpetuates a faith in the consent form and
what it can deliver that is largely unfounded, not least because clinical
trials research is of a very different nature to that involving data and
samples. One illustration of which is the fact that the respective regula-
tory regimes for data and samples provide that in certain circumstances
consent can be removed from the equation if research is to be conducted
in an anonymised fashion.
C. The Status of Regulatory Consent Forms as Evidence
of Consent
Where explicit consent is required by the statutory provisions outlined
above, but there is no correlate legal requirement for written consent,
then a signed document indicating the participant’s assent, for
example to use of their tissues, would at most constitute evidence that
appropriate, legally required consent procedures had been under-
taken.82 In the context of the lawful processing of personal data, the
Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection has advised that ‘oral
consent may be difficult to prove and, therefore, in practice, data con-
trollers are advised to resort to written consent for evidentiary
reasons’.83 This evidence may be admitted in civil proceedings where
it can be ‘shown to form part of the records of a business or public
81 GAfREC applies to all health and social care research that falls within the
remit of the NHS and the departments of health of the four UK administra-
tions, Department Of Health, ‘Governance Arrangements for Research
Ethics Committees: A Harmonised Edition’ (2011) at 9.
82 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Human Tissues: Legal and Ethical Issues’
(1995) at [6.21].
83 Art 29, Working Party Opinion, above, n 74 at 25.
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authority’.84 The absence of such a form might indeed favour a claimant
in civil proceedings as a prima facie indicator of sub-optimal procedures.
Equally, where a tangible form exists, its evidentiary value can only
imperfectly reflect the nature of the participant’s act or (perhaps more
properly) their intention in consenting. In the case of AB v Leeds
Teaching Hospital NHS Trust (which preceded the HTA 2004), the
consent form signed by a bereaved mother was cited as evidence that
she had not imposed conditions upon a post-mortem examination
carried out on her stillborn child.85 Specifically, the terms of her
consent had not precluded retention of the infant’s organs by the
hospital trust.86 This illustrates the legalistic framing of the document
as direct evidence of the categories of activities which had (or had
not) been excluded by its signatory’s consent. Nevertheless, illustrating
the limitations of such evidence, in the instant case the judge speculated
that the mother’s emotional distress might have prevented her from
calling to mind her existing knowledge of what a post-mortem entails,
thus raising questions about her comprehension of that to which she
apparently consented.87
We are reminded of Lord Diplock’s observation in Sidaway that
consent ‘is a state of mind personal to [the individual]’; albeit that
this was said in the context of consent in a treatment setting, it has
equal resonance here.88 A signed form only proves that it was signed.
Making a connection between the form as an evidentiary artefact and
the intentions of the research participant depends on inference, the
soundness of which will rely on the wider facts of any particular case.
Even if this can be shown to capture accurately a participant’s state of
mind, it only does so at a single point in time. The standard response
that participants can always withdraw at any time and for any reason
if they change their mind is scarcely adequate if our concern is to
maintain both trust and the continuity of the research relationship.89
84 Civil Evidence Act 1995, s 9(1). In Scotland, the equivalent provision may be
found in the Civil Evidence (Scotland) Act 1988, s 5(1).
85 [2004] 2 FLR 365, [2004] 3 FCR 324, at [105].
86 However, in the instant case it was found that the clinicians had been negli-
gent in failing to discuss with the parents the possibility of organ retention
following post-mortem examination, so the consent forms were in effect
documentation of negligent consent procedures. The relationship between
consent forms and action in negligence is discussed further in section IV
below.
87 AB v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust, above, n 85 at [105].
88 Sidaway, above, n17 per Lord Diplock at [658].
89 For an account of the sources of this right and critical reflection on its exist-
ence, see GO Schaefer and A Wertheimer, ‘The right to withdraw from re-
search’ (2010) 20 (4) Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 329.
Med. L. Rev. Consent form in health research 19
 at Edinburgh U
niversity on June 12, 2013
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
D. Sanctions and Remedies following Violations of Written
Consent
The key question for this paper is what legal consequences follow if re-
search is conducted in ways that deviate from the terms of a consent
form where one has been signed and fails to meet individuals’ expecta-
tions about what will be done with their tissues and data. If investigators
pursue research of a kind that is prima facie excluded by the terms of the
consent form, then whether this form is of any consequence for regula-
tory purposes will depend on whether the particular research use is one
requiring consent. If the answer to this question is affirmative, it is most
likely that, under the consent requirements of the regulatory regimes
outlined here, the terms of consent (as evidenced by the form) must
be respected for fear of penalty or fine. But this does not mean that all
research conducted beyond the limits of the consent form would neces-
sarily result in sanction (the statutes only prescribe certain matters).
Moreover, it does not follow that the aggrieved research participant
qua individual has any remedy in law even if statutory requirements
have not been followed.
For example, it is an offence punishable by fine or imprisonment for a
researcher to undertake an activity falling under the HTA 2004 defin-
ition of a ‘scheduled purpose’ without the appropriate consent, or to
conduct non-consensual DNA analysis.90 However, the HTA 2004
does not provide any direct remedy for the individual who feels their
interests have been harmed, for example, by research conducted
outwith the terms of their written consent and thus affronting their au-
tonomy. In the context of data protection, the UK Information Commis-
sioner can serve data controllers with enforcement notices if satisfied
that they have contravened any of the principles contained in the DPA
1998.91 Such a notice, however, only constrains the activities of the
data controller and does not offer personal remedy to the individual.
It is the case that a data subject who has suffered substantial distress
or damage as a result of the data controller or other party contravening
the DPA 1998 might be entitled to compensation under the Act.
However, distress alone is insufficient grounds for compensation
unless the data were processed for one of the ‘special purposes’, of
which research is not one.92 A data subject might also give written
notice to a data controller to require them not to process data in a
90 Human Tissue Act 2004, ss 5 and 45.
91 Data Protection Act 1998, Part V.
92 ‘Data Protection Act: Claiming Compensation’ (Information Commissioner’s
Office 2007) ,http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_
protection/practical_application/claiming_compensation.pdf. accessed 13
November 2011; Data Protection Act 1998, s 3.
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way that would cause substantial and unwarranted distress or damage.
In other words, any person can alert a data controller of the strong like-
lihood that particular attempts to process particular data (as identified)
will affect their interests and could result in a breach of the Act.93 This
does not mean, however, that a remedy in law will necessarily result. A
court must still determine if the notice is justified (on application by the
person) and if so can order a data controller to comply.94
As noted above, written consent is required for most activities using
reproductive materials to be lawful under the HFE Act 1990. As illu-
strated by the case of Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust v A and
others, the precise scope of the terms of the recorded consent is likely
to be forensically applied.95 In the instant case (which did not concern
research), the consent forms signed by the husband and wife seeking
treatment were used to determine the exact scope of that to which the
husband had agreed.96 The HFE Act 1990 creates an offence, punish-
able by fine or imprisonment, of creating or using embryos or storing
or using gametes in ways that are not authorised under a licence.97 Fa-
cilities may have their licences revoked if the person responsible is guilty
of such an offence or fails to ensure that licence conditions or ‘suitable
activities’ are adhered to, including obtaining appropriate consent.98
However, once again no direct remedy is available to individuals
under the HFE Act 1990 in these circumstances.99
Under the CTR 2004, it would be unlawful to conduct a trial that
departs from the terms of the consent form and supporting information
documents as approved by the REC to the extent that this breaches the
requirement that (barring emergency safety measures) authorised clinic-
al trials must be conducted in accordance with the research protocol, the
terms of the authorisation, the decision of the REC, and ‘any particulars
or documents’ accompanying the application.100 It is an offence to
embark upon a trial without a favourable REC opinion or to provide
the licensing authority or REC with ‘any relevant information which
93 Data Protection Act 1998, s 10.
94 Ibid at s 10(4).
95 [2003] All ER (D) 374 (Feb), [2003] EWHC 259 (QB).
96 Ibid at [27]. The husband was found not to have consented to the accidental
fertilisation of his wife’s egg with a stranger’s sperm, so under the terms of the
Act was not the legal father of the resultant twins.
97 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 41.
98 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 18.
99 The only direct remedy available to individuals is under the HFE Act 1990 s
44 which pertains to the civil liability to children born disabled due to acts or
omissions on the part of the treatment facility.
100 CTR 2004, Regulation 29. The consent forms comprise key elements of the
information that must, under the CTR 2004, be supplied to the REC to
inform their decision (Paragraph 3 of part 1 to Schedule 3).
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is false or misleading’.101 However, as noted above, these regulations
only provide an aspirational standard for health-related research other
than clinical trials, so the sanctions available under them are of
limited relevance to other kinds of health-related research. Furthermore,
and as with other regulatory regimes, the CTRs do not provide individ-
ual research participant remedies but rather rely on the threat of crim-
inal sanction to police the system.
All of this having been said, the requirement for REC approval is not
restricted to clinical trials; it is needed for any research using NHS
resources or involving NHS patients.102 However, the role of RECs in
ensuring research proceeds according to existing consent terms can be
limited. For example, tissue-banks may now apply for overarching
up-front ‘research tissue bank’ approval, with only limited requirements
to report back to RECs.103 Furthermore, although the REC approval
process is highly likely to include approval of consent documentation,
it is not the REC’s responsibility to offer a legal opinion on research pro-
posals and RECs do not have any clearly established responsibility for
projects after they have received approval.104 RECs are not responsible
for enforcement if research is not carried out as agreed; this is the role of
the relevant regulator.105 Yet, as we have seen, there are limits to what
sanctions either the HTA or the Information Commissioner is able to
impose. The newHealthResearchAuthority is chargedwith both protect-
ing participants’ rights and facilitating and promoting health research.106
No legislative instrument has yet addressed its powers of sanction. As to
self-help, participants might claim for compensation under the law of
tort and REC-approved trials must have adequate insurance and
101 CTR 2004, Regulations 12 and 50. For offences and penalties see Regula-
tions 49 and 52.
102 GAfREC, n81 above, at 2.3.1–2.3.6.
103 NRES SOPs v5.1, above n 28, at para 11.31c–d. A research tissue bank is
defined as ‘a collection of human tissue or other biological material,
which is stored for potential research use beyond the life of a specific
project with ethical approval or for which ethical approval is pending’
(NRES SOPs v 5.1 at 181–8). Although research tissue bank must be
licensed by the HTA and approval must be renewed every five years, REC
approval will not be required at an individual project level for studies
using biobank resources.
104 GAfREC, above, n 81 at [3.2.11]; S McGibbons, ‘Mapping the Regulatory
Space’, in J Kaye et al (eds) Governing Biobanks: Understanding the Inter-
play between Law and Practice (Hart 2012) 51, 78.
105 GAfREC, ibid at [3.2.15].
106 The new Health Research Authority was established by The Health Re-
search Authority Regulations 2011, SI 2011/2341, which came into force
1 December 2011 in the wake of the publication of the Academy of
Medical Sciences, ‘A New Pathway for the Regulation and Governance of
Health Research’ (2011). Its functions are laid out in the Health Research
Authority Directions 2011 (1 December 2011).
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indemnity arrangements to meet such claims.107 However, as will be dis-
cussed further below, there have traditionally been barriers to bringing an
action in tort if the harm suffered is neither material nor significantly
affects the participant’s mental or psychological integrity.
E. Gaps in the Protection of Participants’ Interests
The above paragraphs indicate that there are only very limited oppor-
tunities for individuals to access direct legal remedy under the statutory
regimes governing health-related research, including the lawful use of
personal data or human tissue. The lack of remedy for non-consensual
use of their samples becomes even more apparent when we attend to
the limited legal requirements for consent. Consider the contentious
issue of commercial uses of, and access to, research resources compiled
using participant data and samples. What remedy, if any, might a par-
ticipant have if she or he objects to this at a future stage? The consent
form might or might not make mention of the potential for such com-
mercial uses. If the terms of a consent form signed by a participant
clearly and explicitly excludes these types of secondary uses of their
tissues or data (that is, for ‘commercial research’), but these uses fall
outwith the requirements for consent under the DPA 1998 or the
HTA 2004 (for example because the data or samples will be adequately
anonymised), then these statutes would neither prohibit the research nor
would they offer the participant any legal remedy if the excluded
research were to go ahead. These statutory frameworks in themselves
cannot deter or compensate for such research uses.108 It has been
noted that the presumption apparent in much professional research
guidance109—that anonymisation is sufficient to legitimise research
107 NRES SOPs v 5.1, above, n 28 at [3.56] and Annex G.
108 It is true that research ethics approval is a requirement for non-consensual
medical research using tissues from living donors under the HTA 2004,
and so we might reasonably doubt whether a Research Ethics Committee
would approve a secondary research use that specifically went against the
terms of the original consent, but what would be the position if the
consent form was silent? A REC might require that re-consent is sought, al-
though this is not always practicable; equally, it might adjudge that the re-
search can proceed so long as data or samples are adequately anonymised.
This is the classic ‘consent or anonymise’ approach as outlined earlier and
discussed by the Academy of Medical Sciences (2006), above, n 4.
109 General Medical Council, Good Practice in Research and Consent to
Research: Supplementary Guidance (GMC, 4 May 2010); British Medical
Association, Confidentiality and Disclosure of Health Information
Tool kit available at ,http://bma.org.uk/practical-support-at-work/ethics/
confidentiality-tool-kit. accessed 11 August 2012; Royal College of Physi-
cians, Royal College of Pathologists and British Society for Human Genetics.
Consent and Confidentiality in Clinical Genetic Practice: Guidance on
Genetic Testing and sharing genetic Information, 2nd edn, Report of the
Joint Committee on Medical Genetics (RCP, RCPath, London 2011).
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without seeking further consent—fails to recognise that anonymisation
(even if practically achievable to a degree sufficient to protect the parti-
cipant’s privacy interests) ‘does not obviate an individual’s wish to exer-
cise control’ over what may be done with their information or tissue.110
While the use of anonymised samples and data might not be unlawful,
one practical consequence might be that this nevertheless undermines
the trust relationship between researcher and research participant. The
further consequences of this are axiomatic and include wholesale with-
drawal of participants who no longer trust a project.
But in terms of legal remedies, the logically prior question is: what is
the legal interest that might be harmed in such circumstances? In
keeping with wider developments in medical law that display growing
recognition of autonomy interests, we might judge that the entitlement
of research participants to self-determination has been interfered with
inappropriately because their expectations have not been met, because
the basis upon which they agreed to participate has not been respected
or perhaps simply because there has been a unilateral change in ‘the
rules of the game’ by the researcher. However, where there is no regula-
tory requirement to obtain consent or to do so in particular terms, the
consent form has no legal teeth.
Whether a legal remedy is available for harm to participants’ interests
on different grounds is another matter.We do not, yet, have a stand-alone
right to respect for individual autonomy—that is, a recognised remedy for
mere affront to autonomy in circumstances when choices were not
respected, expectations not met or full options not disclosed.111 This not-
withstanding, two furtherpossible routespresent themselves.Thefirst is to
consider the consent form as contract and the second is an action in neg-
ligence. We now turn to the former through an examination of recent
jurisprudence recognising property interests in human samples; contract
being the primary means by which property dealings are regulated.
III. THE CONSENT FORM AS A BASIS FOR ALLOCATING
PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE PSEUDO-CONTRACT
A. Tissue Samples as Property
The position in the UK regarding property rights in tissues obtained
from living persons is unclear and evolving, although at common law
110 Laurie, above, n 3 at 110, 294; quoted section is from Grubb et al, above, n
50 at [13.98].
111 Note that a state’s failure to provide adequate remedies for the protection of
interests caught by the European Convention on Human Rights can be
grounds for citizen action: Pretty v UK (2346/02) [2002] 2 FLR 45,
(2002) 35 EHRR 1 at [61].
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tissue donors have not historically been treated as having property rights
or interests.112 The HTA 2004 does not itself preclude the possibility of
property in human tissue. Although it prohibits commercial dealings in
‘controlled material’ (ie tissues intended for transplant), it equally
reflects the common law position by permitting property in tissue
where there has been an application of human skill.113 This, of
course, implies that property accrues to the person who carries out
such work and not necessarily to the source of the material unless this
is one and the same person.
The case of Yearworth and others v North Bristol NHS Trust has
introduced the possibility that living donors might have property
rights in their own tissues or at least in their own reproductive mater-
ial.114 It concerned the accidental destruction of semen samples stored
for reproductive purposes on behalf of men undergoing cancer treat-
ment. If this judgment can be extended beyond its own facts and
applied to tissue samples in research contexts,115 then it might
provide the basis for recognising participants’ property rights in
donated samples.116 The consequences for the status of the consent
form in such an eventuality include the possibility that it becomes the
legal vehicle for the transfer of said property, operating in a dispositive,
contractual, or pseudo-contractual fashion.
We have reflected previously on the respective roles of consent and
property rights in the context of legitimate uses of human tissue and sug-
gested that recognition of property rights in human tissue potentially
112 Grubb and others, above, n 50 at [19.61]; SHE Harmon and GT Laurie,
‘Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust: Property, Principles, Precedents
and Paradigms’ (2010) 69 (3) The Cambridge Law Journal 476, 484.
113 HTA 2004, s 32(8) and s 32(9)(c). The common law position is probably
best reflected by the case of R v Kelly [1999] QB 621 which recognised prop-
erty in human materials taken without authorisation and so constituting
theft under the Theft Act 1968. The caveat here is that the recognition of
property might be couched in terms of the 1968 Act itself and not necessarily
as a general principle. The point remains moot.
114 [2009] EWCA Civ 37, [2009] All ER (D) 33 (Feb).
115 Cf S Cordell and others, ‘Lost Property? Legal Compensation for Destroyed
Sperm: A Reflection and Comparison Drawing on UK and French Perspec-
tives’ (2011) 37 (12) Journal of Medical Ethics 747 and B Lyons, ‘“The
Good that is Interred in Their Bones”: are there property rights in the
child?’ (2011) 19 (3) Med L Rev 372.
116 This extension remains to be tested in law. It has been observed that by
logical extension, the Court’s reasoning in Yearworth could be applied to
other bodily tissues, or even whole removed organs and body parts, see M
Quigley, ‘property: the future of human tissue?’ (2009) 17 (3) Med L Rev
457. However, it has also been noted that the wording of the decision
gives little direction as to which, if any, other types of tissues it might legit-
imately be extended, see S Harmon, ‘Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust:
a property case of uncertain significance?’ (2010) 13 (4) Medicine, Health
Care and Philosophy 343.
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provides a more effective means of protecting donors’ autonomy than
consent alone.117 We have argued that in a research context, property
rights would establish a strong justiciable legal interest on the part of
participants to exercise control over how their tissues might be
used.118 The aim of the current discussion is not, however, to contrast
consent and property in this way. Rather, our intention is to explore
the role that consent forms might play in defining the nature and
limits of this ‘strong justiciable interest’, as it applies to participants
who donate tissues for research.119 The parameters of any such property
paradigm are likely to be set within the frame of existing precedents; it is
important, then, that this frame is considered.
B. Bailment of Tissues: Legal Requirements for Consent or Other
Formalities
In Yearworth, the Court of Appeal found that the hospital providing
storage for the sperm samples was providing a service of ‘gratuitous bail-
ment’ of the men’s property.120 A bailment arises when one party (the
bailor) voluntarily hands over possession of their property to another
(the bailee) without relinquishing their property rights. The bailee
assumes responsibilities in respect of the safekeeping of the property
while in their possession. These may include a duty to take reasonable
care of the material in line with any special skill they have presented
themselves as having, or promises they have made to the bailor.121 Bail-
ment does not depend on the existence of a formal written document,
such as a consent form. Nor is there a requirement for the legal relation-
ship between bailor and bailee to be based in contract; it can be estab-
lished simply by the voluntary transfer of possession.122 Nevertheless,
the overlap between bailment and contract has been long-recognised.123
117 KMason and G Laurie, ‘Consent or property? Dealing with the body and its
parts in the shadow of bristol and alder hey’ (2001) 64 (5) The Modern Law
Review 710.
118 Harmon and Laurie, above, n 112 at 492; Mason and Laurie, above, n 2 at
452.
119 Ursin has argued that if research participants are recognised as having prop-
erty interests in the tissues that they provide to biobanks, then the consent
form holds the potential to be transformed from ‘a confusing statement of
autonomy and altruism, dependent on the vagueness of trust’ to a more
transparent and concrete contract protecting participants’ property interests,
see LO Ursin, ‘Privacy and Property in the Biobank Context’ (2010) 22 HEC
Forum 211, 219.
120 Yearworth, above, n 114, at [48].
121 Ibid.
122 Yearworth, above, n 114, at [59(h)].
123 Sandeman Coprimar SA v Transitos y Transportes Integrales SL [2003]
EWCA Civ 113, [2003] QB 1270, ‘The principles of the law of bailment
have always overlapped with those of the law of contract, for bailment
and contract often go hand in hand.’ per Lord Phillips MR at [63].
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The Court of Appeal in Yearworth held that the storage arrangements in
this case were ‘closely akin to contracts and should fall within the ambit
of these principles’.124 In the instant case, the forms signed by the men
consenting to the storage of their sperm were one of three sets of docu-
ments produced as evidence before the Court of Appeal (alongside the
storage request form they had signed and a document stating the com-
mitments made by the health trust in respect of the conditions of
storage and level of care the men could expect).125 The Court found
that donors, as the owners of the sperm samples, were entitled to
damages for the loss of their sperm ‘akin to that referable to breach of
contract’ because the health trust responsible for their storage had brea-
ched specific commitments made in these documents.126 That is, the
court found legally enforceable obligations arising from the documenta-
tion, including the consent forms.
The consent form might therefore, as in Yearworth, constitute part of
the legal documentation of a pseudo-contractual relationship between
the parties to a transfer of human tissue as property in bailment. This
form and the terms in which it is framed would then provide evidence
of the underlying agreement between the parties and thus serve to regu-
late the relationship between them by setting out the nature and condi-
tions of this agreement.127 If a consent form is treated as establishing the
scope of the bailment of tissues donated for research, then any research
purposes excluded by its terms would establish important limits of this
relationship, at least with respect to the samples. Therefore, should
researchers pursue such excluded purposes, the consent form could
provide grounds for remedies related to bailment, or indeed more trad-
itional remedies for breach of contract.
Questions arise about the limits to the transitivity of the relationship
between bailor and bailee where the person or organisation responsible
for collecting and taking possession of the original samples and obtain-
ing written consent might not be the same as the person or organisation
conducting the research. This is a particularly pertinent issue in complex
longitudinal projects, such as biobanks. Contracts are normally only
valid with respect to the legal persons between whom they are con-
cluded.128 This notwithstanding, it is possible in law for a third party
124 Yearworth, above, n 114, at [57].
125 Yearworth, ibid at [6].
126 Yearworth, ibid at [48(i)], [58], [60].
127 NE Palmer, Bailment (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1991) Ch 1, Parts IV(B)
and (VI).
128 According to the doctrine of privity of contract, Price v Easton (1833) 4 B
and Ad 433 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B and s 393.
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to undertake sub-bailments.129 The consent form (and accompanying
information documentation) might therefore provide important evi-
dence as to which parties the relationship of bailment extends and to
whom any remedy might be due. To the extent that this provides a
degree of traceability with respect to samples and their use, it might
serve a helpful purpose both with respect to lines of communication—
that is, who must keep who informed of which uses—and also account-
ability for any downstream exploitation of donated samples. Mechan-
isms which facilitate these objectives can assist in instilling trust in the
research process by identifying parties involved and providing means
to determine whether they are indeed trustworthy.130
C. Bailment in Research Contexts: Obligations and Limits
It is, however, open to question whether transfer of possession of human
tissue for research purposes, for example when donated to a tissue-bank,
would qualify as bailment. In the US case of Washington University v
Catalona et al, the District Court held that the relationship between re-
searcher and participants could not be of this kind.131 The first reason
given by the Court was that ‘the medical research community itself
129 Whether this then gives rise to a pseudo-contractual relationship between
the original bailor and the third party will depend on the bailor having con-
sented to the sub-bailment. Without this consent, the original bailee (the
legal person responsible for obtaining the samples and consent) occupies a
position of co-bailor with the donor. The law on sub-bailment is not
wholly clear or consistent in the relevant legal authorities. The original
case is Morris v C. W. Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716 (CA). A
more recent case concerning sub-bailment on terms is KH Enterprise v
Pioneer Container [1994] 2 AC 324, [1994] 2 All ER 250, para 257, al-
though this is not strictly an authority in English law. A more recent author-
ity affirming the significance of the bailor’s consent in creating a relationship
them and the sub-bailee may be found in Sandeman Coprimar SA, above,
n123.
130 Questions about the possible limits to bailment of human tissues should not
distract us from the fact that human tissues can be, and are, held on behalf of
their ‘owner’ under more straightforward contractual arrangements. This
kind of arrangement may be seen in circumstance where commercial
storage of umbilical cord blood is carried out on behalf of parents on the
chance that the blood might be a future source of therapeutic stem cells.
See GJ Annas, ‘Waste and longing—the legal status of placental-blood
banking’ (1999) 340(19) N Engl J Med 1521. Annas observes, in the
context of commercial placental-blood banking in the USA, that such con-
tracts record the parent’s consent to certain uses of the banked tissue, but
may also impose contractual conditions of questionable ethical defensibility
such as indemnity clauses.
131 The Washington University, Plaintiff v William J. Catalona, et al., Defen-
dants. 437 F. Supp. 2d 985; 2006 US Dist., United States District Court
For The Eastern District Of Missouri, Eastern Division, Case No
4:03CV1065SNL, at 44–6. This case, including its conclusions regarding
bailment, was affirmed by the (Federal) Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, Washington University v Catalona 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007).
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has never considered the relationship between an RP [research partici-
pant] and a medical research institution to be one of bailment’.132
This, however, is merely a matter of convention and not law. Conven-
tions can, and do, change. The second reason given was that bailment
implies an expectation that the property will be returned.133 This rea-
soning was called into question by the English Court of Appeal in Year-
worth where it was noted that contractual bailment does not always
require the property be returned to the bailor.134 Nevertheless, the
factual circumstances of Yearworth were such that there was a clear
expectation that that the sperm be returned for reproductive purposes.
This also possibly suggests that if an intention of return—or at least
one of continuing control—is communicated, perhaps through the
consent form, then the type of limits set by Catalona could be distin-
guished. A more legalistic approach to the consent form as pseudo-
contract in which terms and conditions need to be specified might,
then, come to be the vehicle by which expectations and obligations
are communicated and embodied in law.
There are other limitations of the bailment paradigm that could prove
less favourable to the legalistically minded research participant. It is the
nature of tangible research resources such as banked tissues that they are
depleted through their use, for example as samples are used for the ex-
traction of DNA or to create cell cultures. This means that their dona-
tion might be seen to fall outwith the normal conditions of bailment
whereby the bailee is responsible for the temporary safe-keeping of
the property.135 Thus obligations under the bailment paradigm might
not arise at all. Furthermore, even if it can be shown that there exists
a legal relationship of bailment, the participant’s legal property rights
in samples would not extend to new products derived from their
tissues, such as the products of genetic analysis or cell cultures. It is
well established in English law that property interests can be acquired
by those who apply skill to human tissues such that it acquires new attri-
butes.136 This consideration is particularly germane to research con-
texts. The materials that may be of greatest use for research purposes,
or consequent commercial exploitation, are likely not to be the original
donated samples, but the products of these or of an aggregated research
resource comprising multiple individuals’ donations from which are
created something greater than the sum of its parts. To quote the old
132 Catalona (US Dist), ibid at 45.
133 Ibid.
134 Yearworth, above, n 114, at [48].
135 Gilchrist Watt and Sanderson Pty Ltd v York Products Pty Ltd [1970] 1
WLR 1262.
136 Grubb and others, above, n 50 at [19.66]; Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6
CLR 406.
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cliche´ from Moore: these materials are likely to be both ‘legally and fact-
ually’ distinct from the individual samples provided.137 This would con-
siderably restrict the reach of any excluded research uses set out in
consent forms, insofar as these operate as pseudo-contractual bases of
property rights, to the ‘unprocessed’ donated tissue samples only.
D. Tissue Samples as Gifts
It is common research parlance in consent forms to talk of samples and
other contributions as gifts. The metaphorical power of this is self-
evident, but what does it imply in legal terms if property does indeed
exist and consent forms are to act as a dispositive instrument with
respect to research contributions qua gift? The role of intention is key
here, as identified by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics which has
offered the view that:
. . . tissue removed in circumstances other than treatment, which is
voluntarily donated, will be regarded as a gift. Use for purposes
other than those for which consent was given could give rise to a
claim on the part of the person from whom the tissue was
removed. Such a claim will depend on the terms of the original
consent.138
The concept of donations as gifts, the use of which may be limited by
the conditions established through consent, remains at the heart of the
Council’s more recent report on the donation of bodily materials.139
However, as that report observes, the control afforded by consent will
at best be the negative power to preclude certain uses. It does not
supply the positive freedom for participants to specify desired uses.140
Salutary lessons come once again from across the Atlantic. In
Catalona, the District Court found that the research participants had
unconditionally gifted their samples to the University, meaning that
the University had exclusive property rights in the samples.141 In this
case the terms of participants’ consent forms, including the use of the
word ‘donation’ and of logos indicating the University was the organisa-
tion seeking consent, were crucial in the Court’s decision that the tissues
had been gifted to the University.142 While the Court acknowledged that
a written document was not required under State law to establish a gift
relationship per se (this is established by the three conditions of
137 Moore v Regents of the University of California (51 Cal. 3d 120; 271 Cal.
Rptr. 146; 793 P.2d 479).
138 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (1995), above, n 82 at [9.14].
139 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2011), above, n 19 at 124–5.
140 Ibid at 151.
141 Catalona, above, n 131.
142 Ibid at 33.
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intention to make a gift, delivery, and acceptance), the existence of
documented ‘legally effective consent’ is required under federal regula-
tions governing research using human tissue and the terms became of
material import as a result.143
In the UK, as we have seen, obtaining written consent is only a legal
requirement for lawful participation in a clinical trial. It is only best
practice in other kinds of research involving human participants. Fur-
thermore, under English law, a written document stating the donor’s in-
tention in giving is not a necessary condition for an effective gift,
provided there is physical delivery of the goods to recipient and there
is sufficient evidence of the requisite intention.144 The robustness of a
gift transaction depends entirely on evidence of the clarity of the
donor’s intention.145 In Scots law, for example, implied consent to
making a gift will not be sufficient, there must be convincing evidence
or proof of an intention to donate.146 Thus, although not necessary, a
consent form would be highly persuasive in this regard, if not deter-
minative if the reasoning in Catalona were followed. This is particularly
significant because there are growing instances of consent forms for
UK-based research explicitly stating that participants’ samples will be
regarded as a gift.147 This may be compared with the Gillberg judgment
discussed earlier, which provides some indication that in a European
legal context, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, participants’
personal data might be assumed to be the property of the research insti-
tution.148 Factors such as these betray a power imbalance which belies
the putatively empowering nature of the consent process. It is not
current convention for research participants to negotiate or bargain
over the terms upon which they participate in research. The consent
form is invariably presented as an all or nothing affair. A signed
consent form might not, therefore, accurately reflect participants’ inten-
tions or expectations. If, however, rulings such as Catalona and
Yearworth focus attention on the consent form for its probative value,
143 Ibid at 35; Code of Federal Regulations 45 CFR Part 46: Federal Policy for
the Protection of Human. Subjects (‘The Common Rule’).
144 In English law, a gift requires a clear intention on the part of a donor to
donate and either physical delivery of the goods or the execution and deliv-
ery of a deed or the effective declaration of a trust that will make a promise
to give binding, M Bridge, Personal Property Law (3rd edn, Clarendon Law
Series, Oxford University Press, 2002) at 94.
145 Ibid; Cochrane v Moore (1890) 25 QBD 57; Dewar v Dewar [1975] 1 WLR
1532 (CA).
146 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, The Laws of Scotland, Donation (reissue)
6. Animus Donandi at [21] Reliability of Evidence; Laurie, above, n 3 at
313.
147 Boddington and others, above, n 25 at 504.
148 Gillberg v Sweden, above, n 40 at [87] and [93].
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this will further reinforce the legalistic as opposed to metaphorical role
that they play. A consequence might be a move to more confrontational
engagement around the terms of consent forms as a matter to be nego-
tiated rather than as an expression of trust and a willingness to engage in
the research proposition.
E. Available Remedies Based on Property Rights
Although gifts are perhaps most commonly thought of as unconditional,
in law they can be conditional and revoked upon breach of specified con-
ditions, with ownership reverting to the donor.149 There are complex
rules about the kinds of conditions that can be placed on gifts—for
example, it is not possible to prevent alienation of the property—and
public policy also has a role to play. This might be relevant, for
example, if a court were to take the view that overly restrictive condi-
tions were not in the public interest which supports freedom of research.
Subject to these caveats, however, if a valid condition of gifting as
detailed in a consent form is breached, the gift will be treated as if it
had never occurred and the property must be returned.150
Where a gift is conditional, or where the transfer constitutes bailment,
and the donor retains some property interests in their goods, there might
be scope for remedy under the common law tort of conversion.151 One
of the accepted legal grounds for an action in conversion is that the
goods have been dealt with ‘in a manner inconsistent with the rights
of the true owner’.152 If we accept that written consent constitutes a
pseudo-contract establishing the scope of the participant’s property
interests, then research uses that conflict with the terms of the consent
form could be deemed to constitute unlawful interference with the par-
ticipant’s property rights.153 This could then provide grounds for action
149 R Chambers, ‘Conditional Gifts’, in N Palmer and EMckendrick (eds) Inter-
ests in Goods (2nd edn, London LLP 1998) 430.
150 Re Macleay (1875) LR 20 Eq 186; Bridge (n 116) 99.
151 See D Sheehan, The Principles of Personal Property Law (Hart 2011) Ch 8,
Part II; see also Palmer, Bailment. Ch 3 Part III.
152 L. & Y. Ry Co. v McNicoll (1919) 88 LJKB 601, per Atkin J approved by
Scruton LJ in Oakley v Lyster [1931] 1 KB 148, at [153].
153 The US case, Evanston Insurance Company v Legacy of Life Inc, Court of
Appeal 5th Cir 2011645 F.3d 739 (2011) concerned matters raised by an
underlying legal action brought by the daughter of a deceased woman on
the grounds that the company, to which the deceased woman’s estate had
donated her organs and tissues for non-profit research, had breached the
conditions of consent by using these for commercial purposes. The lawsuit
in which the daughter sought to argue this amounted to theft of property
has been settled by confidential agreement (see fn 4 of the above case
report). Upon referral of the separate question of whether, for the purposes
of the company’s insurance coverage, the use of the donated tissues consti-
tuted damage to property, the Supreme Court of Texas held that loss of the
use of tangible property does not include the loss of use of the mother’s
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based in conversion.154 According to the separability requirement, a
thing will only meet the necessary conditions for an action in conversion
if it has the necessary property of separateness from the body.155 It has
been argued that excised body parts may meet this condition.156 If there
is found to have been unlawful conversion then a research participant
may be due remedy in the form of return of their ‘goods’, as well as
or in place of damages, under the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act
1977.157 The doctrine of specification in Scots law, meanwhile, offers
the possibility that the original source of property may be entitled to
compensation for the loss of that which has become irreversibly
altered without their consent, such that it has become a new entity pre-
cluding the return of the original property.158 However, neither return
of the original tissue samples nor compensation may adequately
address the interests of participants insofar as neither of these remedies
will preclude the on-going use of research products already derived from
the participant’s tissues and data which, as noted above, are most likely
to be found to be the property of those responsible for their skilled
production.
tissues by the daughter or her mother’s estate (Evanston Insurance Company
v Legacy of Life, Inc., No 11-0519 (Tex. Supreme Court, 29 June 2012)
online report available here ,http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/
historical/2012/jun/110519.pdf..
154 It is sufficient that the person in possession of the goods acts in such a way as
to deprive the claimant of their property rights in the goods, this must be
through action not omission, but harm need not be intended. Because a
claimant must retain immediate possessory rights to be able to sue in conver-
sion, this action is unlikely to be available to a research participant whose
consent form recorded that they had relinquished these, see Sheehan,
above, n 151 at Ch 8 Part II.
155 R v Bentham [2005] UKHL; [2005] 1WLR 1057 ‘One cannot possess some-
thing which is not separate and distinct from oneself. An unsevered hand or
finger is part of oneself. Therefore one cannot possess it.’ per Lord Bingham
at [8].
156 RJ Hardcastle, Law and the Human Body : Property Rights, Ownership and
Control (Hart 2007) 161; JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford
University Press 2000) 122.
157 It has been suggested that the courts would be more likely to order return of
biological materials to their source than to award damages, given the per-
sonal nature and likely lack of market value of such materials. Hardcastle,
ibid at 163.
158 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, The Laws of Scotland, 11 ‘Corporeal Move-
able Property, (5) Original Acquisition of Ownership of Corporeal Move-
able Property (g) Specificatio or Specification’. The doctrine of
specification does not exist as such in English law, but an approximate
equivalent may be identified in some older texts. There is precedent law
for extending the doctrine of specification to include living organisms,
albeit not human tissue (Kinloch Damph Ltd v Nordvik Salmon Farms
Ltd (Outer House, Court of Session, 30 June 1999) unreported—available
here ,http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/ca291499.html.—cited in
Hardcastle, above, n156 at 166).
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We can see then that a consent form could operate in a variety of ways
if property in research samples is recognised as accruing in the first in-
stance to their original source. No written or formal document is neces-
sarily required for a gift or bailment to have been made in law. However,
where such a form exists, it might function as documentation of the
nature and scope of a contract-like legal arrangement between the
donor and the recipient, including any conditions placed upon the dona-
tion by the donor. If the terms of this pseudo-contract are then violated
by the researcher, for example by the pursuit of research outwith the
terms of the written consent, then the donor might have grounds for a
range of legal remedies. The one serious, and obvious, limitation here
is the very real possibility of waiver. An increasing number of research
projects now specifically include a term in the consent form stating
that property is transferred or any rights waived. Unless means are insti-
tuted to prevent this happening, the role of consent form as pseudo-
contract is likely to be very limited in practice. This could be addressed
relatively easily by legal provisions akin to those in the Unfair Contract
Terms Act 1977 (as amended) whereby specific restrictions or exclusions
of liability would simply be illegal in a research relationship.
More fundamentally though, this route involving the consent form as
pseudo-contract results in a remedy for breach of contract that reduces
the concern to the contractual moment. This, we contend, fails to
capture the more deep-seated concern about the breach of trust that
occurs when the research relationship breaks down. It also suggests
that contract-like remedies such as return of property or damages satis-
factorily address the underlying harm. This is not so if the interest lies in
the specific implementation of what was promised, that is, to conduct
the research in trustworthy fashion and to deliver valuable findings.
IV. THE CONSENT FORM AS THE BASIS FOR ACTIONS
PROTECTING AUTONOMY
A. The Role of Consent Forms in Establishing Negligence: Legal
Requirements
When the research uses of a participant’s voluntarily donated tissues or
data depart from the purposes that she or he might expect (either
because consent for these was never sought, or because these uses
were clearly excluded by the consent that was obtained), it falls to be
considered whether there is negligence on the part of the researcher.
That is, has the researcher in some way breached a duty of care to the
participant and does this result in a harm for which damages are due?
The following analysis considers the standard criteria for a successful
negligence action but in the context of thwarted expectations. That is,
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can a departure from consent terms (or subjective expectations) provide
a justiciable basis for a remedy in negligence against the researcher when
the affront is in effect a breach of trust?
B. Establishing a Duty of Care
Where researchers are also clinicians, with attendant professional
duties, the existence of a duty of care in respect of participants’ health
is unambiguous.159 Research and experimentation are often conducted
within the clinical setting and this will delimit the duty and the bound-
aries of appropriate conduct. Where this is not so, a common law duty
of care will arise in a research relationship provided that it is not unrea-
sonable to impose one, harm is reasonably foreseeable, and there is suf-
ficient ‘proximity’ in the relationship between the parties.160 A duty of
care might also arise if there is a contractual relationship.161 This can
be important in the context of healthy volunteers and private research
organisations and might be of increasing importance in the future in
light of the discussion in section III above. However, even in the
absence of an explicit contract, any consent form will undoubtedly be
scrutinised for evidence of the requisite relationship between researcher
and participant to found a duty of care in tort.162 For example, in the US
case Grimes V Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., the research consent
form was regarded both as evidence of a close relationship and of a con-
tract between the researchers and participants—each of these giving rise
to a duty of care.163
In the UK, a straightforward application of the general principles of a
duty of care is likely to yield the same result, viz, that researchers most
certainly owe such a duty to their research participants when there is a
consent form provided by the first party and signed by the second.164
159 HS Richardson and L Belsky, ‘The ancillary-care responsibilities of medical
researchers: an ethical framework for thinking about the clinical care that
researchers owe their subjects’ (2004) 34 (1) Hastings Center Report 25.
160 These are the conditions of the ‘Caparo test’, Caparo Industries plc v
Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605.
161 Mason and Laurie, above, n 2 at 133–4.
162 See eg Goodwill v Goodwill Pregnancy Advisory Services [1996] 2 All ER,
[1996] 7 Med LR 129; Vowles v Evans [2003] 1 WLR 1607, CA; Fairlie v
Perth and Kinross Healthcare NHS Trust 2005 SLT 1200 (OH)—these cases
address the necessary characteristics of relationships giving rise to duty of
care, rather than the specific facts of research relationships.
163 Grimes v Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc. 366Md 29, 782 A2d 807 (2001) at
[842]–[843]; G Johnson, ‘Grimes v Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc: The
Court of Appeals Maryland distinguishes special relationships that may
arise to the level of a contractual relationship between researchers and non-
therapeutic research participants’ (2001 ) 9 University of Baltimore Journal
of Environmental Law 75.
164 Though it is worth noting that the European Court of Human Rights
rejected the proposition that the applicant in Gillberg v Sweden (above, n
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This will be harder to establish in cases where research is conducted on
anonymised data and samples.165 There are no precedents on this point
and a court faced with the scenario might find it counter-intuitive to
hold that researchers have a duty of care to individuals whose identity
is unknown to them. Proximity is likely to be a pivotal consideration,
with duties of care more likely to arise with respect to intermediary
authorising bodies, such as research ethics commitees, tissue bank cus-
todians, or data controllers, rather than researchers themselves.
Assuming a duty of care can be established, it must then be deter-
mined what standard of care it would be reasonable to expect from
researchers and which acts or omissions might be said to breach this
standard. In particular, we can ask whether researchers’ duties might
reasonably be said to extend beyond protecting the immediate health
and bodily integrity of participants to respecting participants’ interests
in exercising their autonomy over the use of their samples or data, as
suggested earlier.
C. The Role of Consent Forms in the Expected Standard of Care:
Legal Obligations
The consent form, insofar as it details commitments made by the
researchers to participants and creates expectations about the limits to
permissible research uses, might itself be seen as embodying the stand-
ard of care that the research participant is reasonably entitled to
expect. The form would then function as the benchmark against
which any breach of this standard leading to harm might be assessed.
For example, in Yearworth (although this case did not concern a re-
search relationship), the Court of Appeal had recourse to lodged docu-
mentation, including the appellants’ consent forms and accompanying
documents containing specific commitments by the hospital trust to
the men about the way their semen would be stored. It was held in
part that this gave rise to particular responsibilities in looking after
this property.166 In this context, the precise terms of the consent form
become markers of the expected standard below which care is likely
to be seen as negligent. This is no different to the approach in informa-
tion disclosure negligence actions in the wider treatment context, albeit
that the actual legal standard that is required is always context specific;
40 at [96]) owed a profesional duty of confidence to his research partici-
pants, despite his written commitments to them assuming such a duty, as
they had not appointed him to be their doctor.
165 A related complex question is who would owe a duty of care when there
might be a chain of researchers dealing with (anonymised) data and
tissues and who have no direct relationship with the research participants.
166 Yearworth, above, n 114, at [13].
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it is set by the Bolam principle for determining professional
misconduct.167
According to Bolam, the standard of care to which someone will be
held is that of ‘the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to
have that special skill’.168 There are few indications of how this
would apply in the research context. We have suggested elsewhere
that the CTR 2004 provide a clear benchmark for the standards
expected in clinical trials, such that harm arising from departure from
these regulations could found a successful negligence action.169 As out-
lined above, the research governance frameworks for health and care re-
search require all health-related research to mirror the statutory
requirements of the CTR 2004, at least with respect to best practice
and the consent form. If this is indeed taken to establish the benchmark
outwith the strict confines of clinical trials, then it would mean that only
those studies that proceed with valid written consent and in accordance
with the information contained in the research documentation approved
by a REC would meet the expected professional standard of care among
researchers. On this reasoning, research practices might be seen as neg-
ligent where they fall below the broad standard of adhering to the prac-
tices and documentation that have been approved by a REC. However,
we cannot assume that RECs will always be involved, particularly in
cases where anonymised data and sample research are involved or in
cases where consent has not been sought. In both circumstances, the
courts would have to look to the research ‘profession’ to determine
what the ‘ordinary skilled man’ would do. Consider, for example,
Simms v Simms and Another which dealt with the lawfulness of
highly experimental treatment in incapacitated patients.170 In this
case, there was no consent form and the matter fell to be decided on
the basis of responsible professional opinion; this was held to be satisfied
on evidence from three professionals that they would be willing to
proceed despite the fact that there was no body of opinion in the field.
This raises a dichotomy for the courts in establishing appropriate stan-
dards of care. The CTR route is clearly appropriate when research
involves physical contact and where the written consent form is the
167 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118, para
121. Johnston and Kaye have suggested that UK Biobank could have a duty
of care such that it would be negligent in not feeding back to participants’
incidental findings of serious treatable conditions uncovered in the course
of research, C Johnston and J Kaye, ‘Does the UK biobank have a legal ob-
ligation to feedback individual findings to participants?’ (2004) 12 (3) Med
L Rev 239, 261.
168 Bolam, ibid at [121].
169 Mason and Laurie, above, n 2 at 620.
170 Simms v Simms and Another [2003] 2 WLR 1465.
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norm; but research itself takes many forms and Simms highlights the im-
portance of professional opinion or custom in cases where consent has
not been obtained or in other instances outside the CTR regime.
While the courts will always be ultimate arbiters of appropriate stan-
dards, the relevance of this lies in how far professional research
custom or practice—for example by including or excluding particular
terms in a consent form or, indeed, seeking consent at all—will hold
sway in setting professional standards. Consider the words of JS Mill:
‘He who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice.’171
Even if a claimant is successful in convincing a court of the existence
and breach of a duty of care, there remains the significant hurdle of
being able to fit her or his claim into the accepted categories of harm.
The claimant would have to show that she or he suffered damage to
property, psychiatric injury, or economic loss within the strict rules gov-
erning that particular head of damage.172 At first blush, this seems
highly problematic because the affront of not having one’s consent
respected or expectations met is not self-evidently captured by any of
these categories. Most recently, however, the courts have begun to rec-
ognise other forms of harm, notably to autonomy interests, and in ways
that might signal yet another important role for the research consent
form.173
D. The Consent Form as Evidence of Harm to Autonomy
Yearworth relied on property to show that a legally recognised form of
harm had been constituted, viz, destruction of the property of the claim-
ant.174 However, if this is set aside and the research in question involves
no direct intervention with participants and no destruction of their
‘property’, then it seems unlikely that any of the traditionally accepted
categories of harm will apply. The kind of harm most likely to be
engaged by departure from consent terms is harm to the participants’
interest in affront to their autonomy and loss of control in determining
the kind of research in which they are involved or the kinds of uses to
which their data or tissues might be put. Harm to such interests
171 JS Mill, On Liberty, in J S Mill: Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Representa-
tive Government (Everyman’s Library, London 1971) at 116.
172 For a landmark consideration of the issues, especially regarding psychiatric
injury, see McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 (HL); for critical com-
mentary, see RMuheron, ‘Rewriting the requirement for a “Recognized Psy-
chiatric Injury” in negligence claims’ (2012) 32(1) Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 77.
173 Harmon and Laurie, above, n 112.
174 Yearworth, above, n 114, at [50]. It has been suggested that Scots Law could
deal with the same scenario as an example of ‘gratuitous contract’, see WW
McBryde, ‘Contract Law—a solution to delictual problems’ (2012) 8 Scots
Law Times 45.
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simply does not fit the established categories to constitute negligence
unless (improbably) this could be shown to cause real mental distress.
Mere upset at the unauthorised use of one’s samples or data would
not be sufficient because the law requires psychiatric injury of a level
of mental distress more or less equivalent to clinically recognised
mental disorder.175
This notwithstanding, several recent judgments in medical negligence
cases, albeit in the context of clinical care, indicate a notable new direc-
tion in the law in the UK.176 These cases each concern circumstances in
which no straightforward causal relationship could be established
between failings on the part of the clinicians in information disclosure
and the harm suffered by patients normally required for an action in
negligence. The lead English case is that of Chester v Afshar.177 Here
the patient did suffer a physical injury, the risk of which she had not
been informed about. However, crucially the patient could not say
that she would not have undergone surgery had she been more fully
informed. On classic causation doctrine, this presented a seemingly in-
surmountable hurdle to tracing the causal connection between the sur-
geon’s failure to disclose the risks of surgery adequately and the physical
injury the patient suffered. The House of Lords nevertheless awarded a
remedy holding that, in a case such as this, negligence should be used to
protect the right of the patient to choose what risks to undertake in a
manner reflecting her autonomy and ability to determine her own life
course. The harm, then, was to autonomy itself. This is not an aberrant
judgement. The protection of autonomy interests was also the basis for
recognising property rights in Yearworth:
In reaching our conclusion that the men had ownership of the
sperm for the purposes of their present claims, we are fortified by
the precise correlation between the primary, if circumscribed,
rights of the men in relation to the sperm, namely in relation to
its future use, and the consequence of the Trust’s breach of duty,
namely preclusion of its future use.178
Harm to autonomy is thus starting to emerge as recognised grounds
for remedy in common law. The question remains open whether these
cases may be read as introducing infringement of autonomy as a harm
175 For example, Reilly v Merseyside RHA [1995] 6 Med LR 246 (CA); Fairlie v
Perth and Kinross Healthcare NHS Trust 2004 SLT 1200 (OH); Grieve v
Salford HA [1991] 2 Med LR 295 (QBD).
176 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] AC 59, 2000 SC 1, HL; Chester v
Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [2004] UKHL 41, above, n 17; Rees v Darlington
Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] AC 309, (2003) 75 BLMR 69.
177 Ibid.
178 Yearworth, above, n 114, at [44(f )(v)].
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within a negligence action, or whether they may alternatively be seen as
the beginnings of a legal recognition of a free-standing tort of infringe-
ment to autonomy.179 In Chester v Afshar, Lord Hope acknowledged
that a ‘patient’s right to make his own decision might be seen as a
basic human right’ warranting protection under common law in the
UK.180 What this might mean for the role of informed consent in re-
search contexts is that a failure to inform a participant of the potential
uses to which their data and tissues might be put could be treated in law
as a failure to respect their interests in autonomous decision-making
where intimate aspects of their physical selves or their sensitive personal
data are concerned. If a failure to inform a participant is an interference
with autonomy, it could be argued that a failure to respect research uses
they believe to have been specifically excluded by their consent is equally
a violation of their right to self-determination. In either of these circum-
stances, the consent formmight function as evidence that the researchers
fell short of the expected standard of care in respect of the kinds of in-
formation provision or adherence to consent conditions required for
participants adequately to exercise their autonomy.181 This, however,
must be set against the role of professional custom as outlined above;
that is, what would a body of responsible researchers in the field con-
sider it appropriate to disclose or, indeed, expect of the consent form
in regulating the research relationship?
In negligence, then, we thus face the possibility of successful actions
depending on how the courts view: (i) the interests in play (notably au-
tonomy) and (ii) the custom and practice of the ‘profession’ (particular-
ly with respect to the kinds of terms normally included in consent
forms—for example, exclusion of any property claims). Importantly,
Chester and Yearworth taken together reveal two core sets of research
participant interests: (1) being sufficiently informed at the time that
consent is obtained, and (2) being able to exercise continuing control
of one’s contribution to a research initiative. This reveals where the
proper focus of our attention should lie in the design of responsible re-
search conduct. Whether, however, this should be regulated primarily
by the consent form itself is open to serious question as we argue below.
179 Laurie, ‘Personality, Privacy and Autonomy in Medical Law’, in NRWhitty
and R Zimmermann (eds) Rights of Personality in Scots Law:A Comparative
Perspective (Dundee University Press 2009) 453, 467; Mason and Laurie,
above, n 2 at 120.
180 Chester v Afshar, above, n 17 at [30].
181 It has been suggested that under Scots law, damages may be awardable in
solatium for the non-material injury to dignity that may follow from
conduct that fails to respect someone’s autonomy—see NR Whitty,
‘Rights of personality, property rights and the human body in Scots Law’
(2005) 9 Edinburgh Law Review, cited in Laurie(2), above, n 179 at 473.
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V. CONSENT AS RELATIONAL PROCESS
Albeit speculative, the preceding legal analysis suggests the following
conclusions about the emerging legal status of the consent form in
medical research:
(i) There is a drive towards the ‘written informed consent’ configur-
ation across regulatory regimes, even when this is not (yet) man-
dated by law.
(ii) The law will often regulate the form that consent should take
without considering the underlying interests at stake or the func-
tion that consent needs to perform.
(iii) Legal remedies recognised to date might result in damages, return
of samples, and destruction/non-use of data, but all of these
signal a breakdown of the trust that is so central to the research
relationship.
(iv) The legalisation of the consent process as a one-off, up-front event
is a distraction from the fundamental importance of fostering trust
and respecting the underlying interests.
(v) There is some legal recognition that these underlying interests relate
both to what participants are told at the beginning of the process
and what participants can expect is done with their research contri-
bution throughout the process.
To be clear, we do not take issue with law’s involvement in research.
Indeed, given the centrality and growing importance of autonomy inter-
ests in human rights terms, there is a need for states to provide adequate
recognition of these interests and appropriate legal remedies where these
are interfered with lest they face claims from their citizens of infringe-
ment of the European Convention on Human Rights.182 Rather, our
concern lies with the drift towards form over function when this
seems to fail on so many levels. This is in part because it draws attention
to matters at the beginning of the research enterprise rather than seeing
initial consent as merely the start of a research relationship. We envisage
182 The most likely article to be engaged in this context is Art 8, see Pretty v UK,
above, n 111. The European Court of Human Rights has held that obliga-
tions on the State might ‘involve the adoption of measures designed to
secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals
between themselves’: X and Y v The Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235,
[1985] ECHR 8978/80 at paragraph [23] - such measures might include
the provision of legal remedies; see also Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR
305 at [32]. All of this is of course subject to a state being able to show
that interference with citizen rights was both necessary and proportionate
to achieve a legitimate social end: Powell and Rayner v United Kingdom
(Application 9310/81) (1990) 12 EHRR 355, [1990] ECHR 9310/81,
para 41 and references therein.
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the research relationship as constituted by the trust which research par-
ticipants place in researchers to act as custodians of their research con-
tributions, to strive to achieve the stated research objectives, and to
respect their interests throughout the life course of the research. Such
a relationship of trust exists irrespective of whether there is direct
contact between researcher or participant after initial consent is
obtained, even when a participant has signalled no interest in their re-
search contribution (for example through blanket or generic consent),
and even in circumstances when data samples are used without
consent. This is because the custodian role, if improperly executed,
can nonetheless result in harm to those who participate in research.
Overriding focus on the consent form has many drawbacks for both
parties to the research relationship. For one thing, it suggests that re-
searcher obligations are discharged and exhausted with the signing of
the form. This is not true from either an ethical or a legal perspective
and is a dangerous pretext on which to proceed. Furthermore, this snap-
shot approach to capturing participant expectations ties the hands of all
parties. Participants might change their minds positively towards a re-
search project but have no means of communicating this. Equally,
researchers and research ethics committees will be constrained by a
consent form that appears to provide evidence that limits the research
project when no one can be sure that it remains an accurate reflection
of participant attitudes many years after the signing of the form. An
obvious retort is the option of re-consent, but this is not always a
viable option, either practically or economically. A legalistic approach
to the consent form merely exacerbates the evidentiary fallacy. It
reduces our concerns to a single moment—the moment of signing—
which, while important as an instance of presumptive evidence, misses
the point that a breach of trust can arise as much from a failure to
realise research objectives as from a departure from original consent
terms. Research is uncertain and attitudes change. The consent form
alone simply cannot deal with these realities.
All of this speaks to the importance of communication in the research
relationship. By this we do not mean necessarily direct communication
between researchers and participants, but the opportunity for, and argu-
ably obligation of, researchers to disseminate details of the research
widely. This might include information about the protocol and findings
(in accessible formats), changes to research design (including
REC-approved departures from original consent), information about
which parties have access to research resources (and for which pur-
poses), and, ultimately, which benefits have come from research. This
offers multiple opportunities for mutual engagement throughout the
life of a project. This is particularly true with longitudinal research pro-
jects requiring long-term cooperation and buy-in from participants.
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Crucially, from the participant perspective, it offers opportunity for
on-going informedness, enquiry, interaction, and clarification; this
serves not only to render the absolute right to withdraw from research
meaningful, but it can also assist in securing an on-going trusted basis
for research, helping to ensure that the nuclear option of withdrawal
is rarely exercised and that recourse to law and legal remedies is un-
necessary. Finally, this approach could serve as important additional
evidence on the reasonableness of research conduct in keeping partici-
pants informed and, perhaps, as an indication of participants
on-going acceptance of a protocol—even one which changes over
time—if there is continued participation and so acquiescence in the
research enterprise.
We suggest that for all of these reasons, consent ought to be recon-
ceived as a continuing relational process. In these terms, the function
of consent is to signal acceptance and trust in the research endeavour
with all of its uncertainties and vicissitudes over time. This re-orients
our focus to the obligations of researchers to ensure that trust remains
a central consideration; it allows for more flexibility in the conduct of
research, where appropriate, and requires that consent forms communi-
cate this function and the means by which it will be discharged moving
forward. It determinedly avoids giving the consent form pride of place in
the regulation of the research relationship. The process promotes com-
mitment to openness, on-going informedness, and, where appropriate,
re-visitation and re-negotiation of the basis upon which participants
are willing to take part in research.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article contributes to the growing realism about the limits of what
(informed) consent can achieve in protecting and empowering partici-
pants’ autonomy. The analysis strongly suggests that current approaches
to research regulation focus to an excessive degree on up-front, one-off
consent, and that the mechanism of ‘written informed consent’ is be-
coming increasingly entrenched in regulatory and research ethics cul-
tures when this simply cannot offer the flexibility and responsiveness
that modern research practices require. Albeit that some legal remedies
are emerging, the legalisation of the consent process that this represents
potentially acts counter to the interests of both parties in the research
relationship. We suggest that these developments are misguided in priv-
ileging form over function. We advocate a clarification of the function of
consent as a means to signal acceptance and trust in the research endeav-
our over time. Trust must endure throughout the research period lest
participants exercise the one true power that they have: to withdraw.
Failure to respect research participants is a fundamental breach of
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trust. This cannot be reflected or deterred by a consent paradigm that is
based on an oppositional premise, nor can it be captured at a single
moment in time or in a single format. Rather, this reconception of the
function of consent re-orients attention away from the consent form
and towards the on-going obligations of researchers to demonstrate
their trustworthiness with respect to participants’ interests and contri-
butions to research throughout the research relationship.
This is not to suggest that consent forms cannot provide important
evidence about expectations concerning the nature and limits of the re-
lationship between the researcher and the participant; but it is important
to understand that these can change and appropriate governance
mechanisms must be established to accommodate this. Equally, it is
not to deny that consent forms can play an important role in cases
where trust breaks down; even in the pursuit of legal redress. Rather,
we contend that much can be done to avoid these outcomes by
turning the rhetoric of the research relationship into more of a reality.
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